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--RESIST---
February-March, 1978 - 324 Somerville Ave., Somerville, MA 02143 #121 
a call to resist illegitimate authority 
WAR RESISTERS IN EXILE 
Jack Co/houn 
Introduction: After ten years, Amex-Canada Magazine 
has ceased publishing. Begun as a newsletter of the 
Union of American Exiles in /968, Amex-Canada 
played a central role in the struggles of deserters, draft 
resisters, and others against the Indo-China war. This 
article is excerpted from a much longer history of the 
organization, published in the Nov.-Dec. issue of 
Amex-Canada (P.O. Box /89, Station P, Toronto, 
Ontario M5S 2S7, Canada). 
When the first American war resisters left the United 
States for exile in Canada during the mid-1960s, they 
did so as individuals opposed to the Vietnam War but 
unwilling to go to jail for refusng to fight in Vietnam. 
No coordinated exile movement existed to serve the 
needs of newly arriving war resisters, let alone to 
provide political program for expressing a continuing 
opposition to the war. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
local immigration aid groups developed to help the new 
arrivals find housing, jobs, and landed immigrant 
status. At the same time, exile groups were formed 
which, in addition to helping new arrivals, attempted to 
find political means by which to express the exile 
community's continuing opposition to the Vietnam 
War. 
After an initial period of exile community activism, 
with increasing political harassment and repression 
from Canadian police and politicians, the driving force 
of the exile movement began to wane and American war 
resisters became more involved in Canadian life. Many 
joined organizations of the Canadian left and 
nationalist movement, and many others phased out of 
political work to concentrate on building a new life in 
Canada. Others were never highly politically conscious 
or politically motivated. 
In fall 1971, AMEX reflected the political and social 
trend of assimilation into Canadian life. At that time, 
however, AMEX embarked on a six-year campaign to 
win· unconditional amnesty for all war resisters. First, it 
was necesary to develop support for the amnesty 
campaign in the exile communities in Sweden, France, 
and Great Britain. This international exile support 
evolved simultaneously with the creation of a broad, 
cross-class amnesty coalition in the U.S. AMEX played 
a leading role not only in bringing the National Council 
for Universal, Unconditional Amnesty (NCUUA) into 
being, but also in devising political program for the new 
amnesty coalition. 
THE DEFENSE BUDGEf 
AND U.S. STRATEGY 
Banning Garrett 
President Carter's record $126 billion defense budget 
reflects the administration's emphasis on strengthening 
U.S. conventional military capabilities for fighting in 
Europe and for rapid intervention in the Middle East, 
the Persian Gulf and East Asia, while slowing the pace 
of modernization of U.S. strategic nuclear forces. 
Carter's "real growth" budget, for fiscal year 1979 
beginning October i, is designed to help implement a 
new U.S. global strategy approved in a secret Presiden-
tial Directjve, PD 18, which places increased reliance on 
conventional military forces in an era of rough equality 
of nuclear forces with the Soviet Union. 
PD 18, signed by Carter August 25, was based on the 
conclusions of a major intragovernmental review of the 
global balance of power and U.S. strategy and capabili-
ties, Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) 10. 
PRM 10 is the key to understanding the assumptions 
behind most of President Carter's important foreign 
policy decisions. 
PRM 10 concludes that the balance of military power 
- both conventional and nuclear - between the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union is essentially equal and that the 
U.S. has significant advantages in virtually every other 
measure of national power _:.... economic, technological, 
political and diplomatic. In addition, the study 
characterizes the Soviet Union as facing growing inter-
nal problems of labor, steel and energy shortages, a 
slow-down in economic growth, a looming political 
succession crisis, and a continuing conflict with China. 
PRM 10 describes the current period of u.s.:Soviet 
relations as one of both "cooperation and 
competition." 
PRM 10 concludes that if there were a major nuclear 
war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, neither side 
"could conceivably be described as a winner." At a 
minimum, the study predicts, the U.S. would suffer 140 
million people dead and the Soviet Union 113 million, 
and nearly 75 percent of each country's economy would 
be destroyed. PRM 10 describes this situation as a 
nuclear standoff: both the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
have the ability now - and in the foreseeable future -
to inflict unacceptable damage on the other even after 
sustaining a first strike. In short, U.S. strategic forces 
are sufficiently powerful to deter any nuclear attack on 
the United States by the Soviet Union. 
These conclusions of PRM 10 are incorporated into 
PD 18, which commits the U.S. to continue maintaining 
strategic forces capable of inflicting "unacceptable 
damage" on the Soviet Union in response to a Soviet 
first strike. In his directive, Carter judges that to inflict 
such damage, the U.S. must be able to destroy some 70 
percent of the Soviet Union's "recovery resources," 
meaning the economic, political and military facilities 
critical to the functioning of society. Carter goes a step 
further, directing that a reserve force of nuclear 
weapons be maintained for use after a nuclear exchange 
to ensure that the Soviets suffer greater damage than the 
U.S. 
Carter says more bluntly in his directive than previous 
presents that the U.S. will not aim at building a 
"disarming" first strike capability against the Soviet 
Union - as long as the Soviets also reject this 
capability. But he also directs that the U.S. accept 
nothing less than equality of strategic forces with the 
Sovi~t Union. 
The administration study apparently concludes that 
current U.S. forces and planned programs for modern-
ization of strategic weapons are sufficient to achieve 
Carter's goals without increasing spending. The FY 
1979 budget asks for $9.8 billion for strategic forces, an 
increase of $500 million over this year but no real 
growth after accounting for inflation. PD 18's policy 
guidelines appear to be behind the administration's 
budget decision to slow development of the MX mobile 
missile - a potential first strike weapon - while 
speeding development of the air-launched cruise missile. 
Secretary of Defense Brown argues that the cruise 
missile is a second strike weapon that will strengthen 
U.S. retaliatory capabilities in light of Carter's decision 
to cancel the B-1, and which will bolster political 
perceptions of the strength of U.S. nuclear forces 
relative to Soviet capabilities. 
Since nuclear weapons are no longer seen as giving the 
U.S. leverage in managing international crises in an era 
of strategic parity with the Soviet Union, PD 18 says the 
U.S. must give increasing significance to conventional, 
non-nuclear military forces. 
PD 18 calls for strengthening U.S. conventional capa-
bilities, noting that in future crises, there will be a 
tremendous advantage to the side which can get its 
troops to the trouble spot first: the other side will have 
to face the political as well as military risks of trying to 
dislodge the forces already there. President Carter 
directs the Pentagon to significantly increase the strate-
gic mobility of U.S. forces for both a "quick hit in 
remote places" and for rapid reinforcement in Europe. 
Carter wants several "light divisions," stationed in the 
U.S., to be readied for possible use in the Middle East, 
the Persian Gulf and East Asia. These forces are to be 
backed by selected naval and air force units able to 
operate without the need of foreign bases. These mobile 
intervention forces are expected to be able to beat the 
Soviets to the Persian Gulf despite Moscow's obvious 
geographical advantage. 
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The Carter defense budget aoes not separate out 
expenditures for mobile interventionary forces for the 
Persian Gulf and areas other than Europe. Much of the 
cost of beefing up these forces is included in NA TO-
oriented expenditures. 
Increased U.S. dependence on oil imports leads 
Carter to rank the Persian Gulf and the Middle East 
with Europe and northeast Asia as areas of vital interest 
to ihe U.S. where Washington would risk military con-
frontation with the Soviet Union. In areas other than 
those judged of critical interest to the U.S., PD 18 says 
Washington should try to rely on other countries to pre-
serve U.S. interests. One official said this policy was 
illustrated by the Zaire crisis last spring when the 
French, Moroccans, Egyptians and others came to the 
aid of the Mobutu regime. The same thing is now 
happening in the Horn of Africa, the official said, 
where others are intervening instead of the U.S. 
PD 18 places the biggest emphasis on strengthening 
U.S. forces for NATO. Carter commits the U.S. to 5 
percent per year real growth in NA TO-related spending, 
which comprises about 40 percent of the entire defense 
budget. Brown told reporters that the bulk of the in-
creases in the FY 1979 budget are for NATO, but, he 
added, "I don't think it is possible to segregate our 
budget into a NATO and a non-NATO part ... an air-
craft that is in the U.S. today can be at an airbase in 
Britain or West Germany tomorrow." 
The Carter budget emphasizes procurement of new 
conventional weapons for use in Europe, including 
increased funds for the A-10 close support aircraft, for 
an improved cargo plane to support rapid deployment 
of troops to Europe, for a new combat helicopter, for 
the new F-16 fighter, and for production of the new 
XM-1 main battle tank. While the Army and Air Force 
got real budget increases in this military buildup, the 
Navy's ship building program was cut back, including 
cancellation of an additional aircraft carrier. 
Overall, Carter directs in PD 18 that the U.S. 
maintain at least as favorable a global military balance 
of power with the Soviet Union as exists now - a 
commitment that should provide continued pressure for 
real increases in defense spending. Efforts by critics 
trying to cut the defense budget will likely have to 
challenge the priorities and policies of PD 18 and even 
the assumptions of PRM 10. Likewise, those who want 
an even bigger increase in defense spending will 
probably challenge PRM l0's assessment of the balance 
of power and Carter's nuclear strategy, claiming that 
the Soviets are striving for and achieving strategic and 
conventional military superiority over the U.S. They 
will likely step up charges specifically that U.S. ICBMs 
are increasingly vulnerable to a Soviet first strike and 
call for stepped up develoment of the "invulnerable" 
MX mobile missile, a program which could cost up to 
$50 billion over the next decade. 
This article is excerpted from the January 30, 1978 issue 
of International Bulletin, (PO Box 4400, Berkeley, CA 
94704. $12 for a 12-month subscription.) 
I NJ: 8;VJ EW ·WI TH .~Q9 JAILED TEN MONTHS 
f N .JaftAtftf JURY PROBE · 
GRAND JURY 
REPRFSSION OF THE 
PUERTO RICAN AND 
CIDCANO MOVEMENTS 
An interview with Maria Cueto and 
Raisa Nemiken 
Liberation News Service 
Introduction: A recent Resist grant went to the 
Alamosa (Colorado) Committee to Stop Grand Jury 
Repression. This is one of a series of defence commit-
tees that are attempting to combat the government's use 
of grand jury investigations to gather information about 
the Puerto Rican and Chicano movements. 
The grand jury was initially formed to investigate 
bombings by the F ALN, a group which calls for Puerto 
Rican independence. But one of the first targets of the 
grand jury was the National Commission on Hispanic 
Affairs of the Episcopal Church (NCHA). Two em-
ployees of NCHA, Maria Cueto and Raisa Nemekin, 
refused to testify before the New York Special Federal 
Grand Jury, and were jailed in March, 1977. They were 
released in late January, when a federal judge ruled that 
there was no legal basis for holding them in jail until the 
current grand jury expires in May, since they had 
3 
committed no crime and had demonstrated that 1hey 
would not testify no matter how long they were kept in 
jail. 
The following interview was conducted by LNS on 
January 27, 1978. 
COULD YOU BEGIN BY DESCRIBING WHY YOU 
BOTH MADE THE DECISION NOT TO 
COOPERATE WITH THE GRAND JURY? 
MARIA: Raisa and I were working with the church at 
the time - with the Hispanic Commission of the Epis-
copal Church. And we took the position of refusing to 
testify because we felt that it was a betrayal of the His-
panic communities we had been working with. 
Basically we had been doing community outreach 
type work. A lot of our work involved seeking resources 
for groups that were trying to get together clinics or 
alternatives in education .. . 
RAISA: . . . Agricultural cooperatives, cultural 
programs. 
MARIA: Even at one time we did research into the 
whole question of how grand juries were using their 
powers to abuse people in communities ... 
In any case, it had taken us a long time to develop 
trust working with the Hispanic community. And we 
felt that if we did cooperate with the FBI or grand jury 
that we would be betraying that trust. 
We also believed that this was an effort on the part of 
the Justice Department and the FBI to attempt to 
destroy the Puerto Rican independence movement and 
the Chicano movement - to discredit them - impli-
cating, harassing, and intimidating - everything you 
can think of. 
WHAT ·KIND OF HARASSMENT DID YOU 
EXPERIENCE FROM THE FBI? 
MARIA: Well, it escalated from their first visit 
[November, 1976), which was just looking for informa-
tion on Carlos Alberto Torres [who had been a member 
of the Hispanic Commission and was being sought by 
the Chicago grand jury]. After that, up until we were 
subpoenaed and incarcerated, they began· following us 
to meetings, they harassed other commission members 
throughout the country. And they began visiting the 
Episcopal Church's headquarters, almost on a nightly 
basis, going through their files. 
RAISA: So we discussed what it meant and we decided 
at that point, for the reasons Maria stated, that if we 
were subpoenaed we would refuse to cooperate with the 
grand jury and we would go and serve our time. 
MARIA: Of course, the Administration of the Epis-
copal Church took an opposing position. They handed 
over all the.files from the inception of the Commission 
back in 1970, up to the very last day when we were 
incarcerated. 
HOW DID YOU BOTH FIRST BECOME INVOLVED 
IN COMMUNITY WORK. AND SUPPORTIVE OF 
THE PUERTO RICAN INDEPENDENCE MOVE-
MENT AND THE CHICANO MOVEMENT? 
MARIA: I come from Phoenix, Arizona. But I did 
some work in East Los Angeles. And I think that's 
essentially where I first became aware of the problems in 
the community. I was a student at the time and I worked 
out of a parish there that was involved in community 
work - welfare rights, police brutality and those kinds 
of issues. 
With reference to the independence of Puerto Rico, 
living in Phoenix, of course, you don't hear about it 
every day. In fact you hardly hear it ever. I think that 
part of my education was here. Because to understand 
about the issues the Puerto Rican people have here, you 
have to understand also what is happening in Puerto 
Rico. And when you start seeing what is happening 
there, you begin to realize that there is an imposition 
there, and they should be independent, and they should 
determine their own destiny and they have a right to 
struggle for their rights. 
RAISA: My experience was a little more recent and 
came about through my work with the Hi¥>anic Com-
mission. The group was made up of people through out 
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FBI repression will help forge a bond 
the country in both the Chicano and Puerto Rican 
movements, so I became aware of what both move-
ments were doing to bring about their self-
determination. 
MARIA: Those were our interests - to bring together 
some kind of understanding between the two move-
ments. A lot of the Chicanos who were part of the 
Commission had no idea what the Puerto Rican struggle 
was all about..~-- And a lot of the Puerto Rican people 
had very little idea even as to what a Chicano was. So it 
· was an educational process that we all underwent 
together. 
DO YOU AND THE COMMITTEE TO END GRAND 
JURY REPRESSION HA VE A POSITION ON THE 
QUESTION OF THE FALN? 
MARIA: The Committee has taken the position that the 
people have the right to struggle at whatever level they 
feel they have to struggle at. We work with the church. 
We struggle from that level. Other people struggle from 
different levels. We do not condemn or condone the 
actions of the F ALN. 
HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE POSITION 
TAKEN BY THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE 
EPISCOPAL CHURCH AND WHAT EFFECT HAS 
IT HAD ON THE WORK THE HISPANIC COM-
MISSION WAS DOING IN THE COMMUNITY? 
RAISA: The administration of the Episcopal Church in 
essense abandoned us, as well as abandoning and 
betraying the Hispanic community. 
MARIA: They failed to see the scope of the investiga-
tion and to understand how it would hinder the ongoing 
work in the communities. . . . The Hispanic Commis-
sion itself has been restructured now so that it's main 
goal is theological development - there's no 
community outreach. 
SO THAT THE GRAND JURY HAS HAD THE 
EFFECT OF CHILLING COMMUNITY 
ACTIVITIES? 
MARIA: Yes. It's definitely had that effect. And under-
standably. . . . People become afraid of really getting 
involved in the community because they see that by 
association they can be called before the grand jury just 
like we were. So it's had its effect, and it's going to keep 
having its effect. And we have to keep fighting against 
that. But it's going to be hard to reverse. 
RAISA: The grand jury system has been used previously 
to carry out the same type of destructive effect on the 
Black movements and the Native American movements. 
HOW DOES THE CHICANO MOVEMENT TIE IN 
WITH THE GRAND JURY'S SUPPOSED PURPOSE 
OF INVESTIGATING THE FALN BOMBINGS? 
between the Puerto Rican and Chicano movements. 
MARIA: I think it's obvious from the many Chicanos 
who have already been subpoenaed - the Lucero 
brothers from the Crusade for Justice in Colorado; 
Ricardo Romero from Colorado and Pedro Archuleta 
from Tierra Amarillo, New Mexico - that they're 
trying to destroy both movements. They know that 
there is solidarity between the Chicano movement and 
the Puerto Rican independence movement. 
DO YOU KNOW OF OTHER INSTANCES OF THE 
FBI HARASSING PEOPLE ACTIVE IN THE COM-
MUNITY WHILE YOU WERE IN JAIL? 
RAISA: That's a very good point. While we were in jail, 
the New· York Committee Against Grand Jury 
Repression began to help educate individuals about 
what the grand jury was doing as well as advocate for 
our release. Certain people like Julio Rosado and Luis 
Rosado were very intimately involved in the develop-
ment of that. And as soon as the New York Committee 
got to the point where it was beginning to develop and 
progress, they were subpoenaed. [They have been in jail 
since late August for ref using to cooperate with the 
grand jury.] 
The same thing happened in Chicago. People like 
Roberto Calvero and Jose Lopez also were involved in a 
committee there against grand jury repression and they 
were called in at very critical points of the development 
of the committee. 
So the grand jury is being used very effectively in 
terms of stopping any kind of advocacy on our behalf, 
at the same time as it's being used in other ways to chill 
the churches and other organizations from doing that 
sort of work in the community, as well as the Puerto 
Rican and Chicano movelT''!nts themselves. 
IS THERE ANY WAY TO LIMIT THE SCOPE OF 
GRAND JURIES? 
MARIA: Unless there is more pressure put on them, the 
grand juries are going to continue at the same pace as 
now or at a faster pace. Every two months there's some-
body being subpoenaed or the FBI is participating in the. 
harassments on the outside. 
RAISA: There are several bills now pending in Congress 
- the Eilberg Bill for one - restricting or limiting some 
of the scope of the grand jury. But that's being fought 
very strongly snce the grand jury is such a good tool. It's 
implemented by the U.S. Attorney and it's totally con-
trolled by them. . . And the FBI likes it, because they 
can use it as a scare tactic or as propaganda to make it 
seem that you're really doing something [criminal]. 
MARIA: It's the only way they have to put people 
away, "legally," without giving them a trial or charging 
them with anything or putting them through the legal 
due-process that is supposed to be given you as a citizen. 
The thing is, the U.S. Attorney has control over the 
grand jury. The 23 people that are sitting there - they 
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don't even know what's happening .... The U.S. Attor-
ney will tell them, "We're investigating the bombings of 
Fraunces Tavern, the F ALN and all other bombings 
that are taking place." He describes to them a bloody 
scene. Then, the first thing he'll ask us is, "Did you see 
the person who took the bomb and placed it at Fraunces 
Tavern?" I mean, I come off looking really nasty if I 
don't want to answer that kind of question. 
Then he asks, "How much money did you give to the 
FALN?" Again, I come off looking really nasty if I 
don't answer that question .... 
If you say, "I don't know anything about that," then 
you have answered the first questin and you have to 
answer all the other questions they ask you. . . or else 
they will be able to cite you for criminal contempt. 
WHAT ARE YOUR PLANS NOW AND DO YOU 
HA VE ANY SUGGESTIONS FOR WHAT PEOPLE 
SHOULD BE DOING TO FIGHT THE GRAND 
JURY? 
MARIA: Our immediate plan is to continue seeking 
support for the rest of the people who are still in jail and 
to stop illegal grand juries such as these. We believe that 
a lot of what helped us was the pressure that was put on 
the judges that handled our case, the assistant U.S. 
attorney, the U.S. Attorney and Griffin Bell. 
RAISA: Demonstrations, pickets and importantly, 
education - educational outreach in reference to the 
grand jury so that people will be prepared for what can 
come down on the individual, and be more prepared to 
deal with any position that person takes. Hopefully that 
position will be noncooperation with the grand jury. 
That's very important. 
MARIA: We feel that as a result of what's happened to 
us, and the position that we've taken, and the fact that 
we've been released - that this is encouraging for any-
body else that may be subpoenaed. 
You know, it's not easy to do time, you don't want to 
go to jail and spend umpteen months in there. But if 
your principles are strong. . . then your position is 
strong. And we think it's encouraging for others who 
may be subpoenaed in the future. 
DO YOU FEEL THAT THE GRAND JURY AND 
THE FBI HARASSMENT HAS AT ALL HAD THE 
EFFECT OF STRENGTHENING THE CONNEC-
TIONS BETWEEN THE CHICANO AND PUERTO 
RICAN MOVEMENTS? 
MARIA: We definitely believe that. And I think they'll 
become stronger ... We think, for example, that our 
release had to do with the pressure that was applied 
from the community at large across the country. . . So 
that the issues are becoming clearer to many. It's con-
firmed to a lot of people that the FBI really is what it is 
- a monster that's trying to destroy human beings' self-
determination. 
AMEX-Canada <continued rrom page 1> 
During our six-year amnesty struggle, AMEX was 
involved in surfacing a military deserter at the 1972 
Democratic National Convention, whose arrest brought 
the amnesty question to the floor of the convention hall. 
In 1976, we were involved in winning fifteen minutes of 
prime time TV during which to nominate a draft resister 
for vice president. From exile, AMEX has battled three 
presidents - Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy 
Carter - over the amnesty issue. We watched Nixon go 
off to his own exile in San Clemente with an uncondi-
tional pardon in his pocket after years of opposing 
amnesty for war resisters. In the aftermath of the Nixon 
pardon, President Ford declared a punitive, conditional 
amnesty. AMEX led a call for a boycott of this phony 
Clemency Program. The boycott was successful. 
Although Ford refused to grant another amnesty, we 
helped keep the issue alive until the 1976 election 
campaign during which the grassroots of the amnesty 
coalition pressed the leading Democratic presidential 
condidates. AMEX helped focus the amnesty campaign 
on candidate Jimmy Carter. From the time of Carter's 
nomination in July 1976 until his inauguration in 
January 1977 we led the attack against the class and race 
discrimination of Carter's proposed draft resister-only 
pardon. 
When Carter announced his unconditional pardon on 
January 21, 1977, AMEX hosted an amnesty conference 
where the amnesty movement blasted Carter for not 
including deserters, bad paper vets, and civilians with 
antiwar charges and records. On April 5, 1977, the 
Carter Administration announced the details of its 
program for some deserters and limited categories of 
vets with less-than-honorable discharges. AMEX led 
NCUUA in attacking the second step of the Carter 
pardon program. 
In 1971, at the beginning of AMEX's struggle for 
amnesty, we were often told by supporters and critics 
that there would never be an unconditional amnesty. At 
some point in the post-Vietnam War period, it became 
likely that there would be some form of limited pardon, 
but we believed it would benefit white, middle-class 
draft resisters at the expense of working class and 
minority war resisters. If the possibility of winning a 
broad unconditional amnesty existed, we believed it 
would result only from widespread grassroots political 
campaigns. It was our goal to build such a grassroots 
movement, to force such a presidential action. Six years 
later, AMEX can take satisfaction in our part in the 
amnesty struggle even though we didn't win our goal of 
universal and unconditional amnesty. 
During the course of our political work in exile, 
AMEX helped forge a new antiwar alternative: going 
into exile. From exile, we were able to lead a popular 
movement through which we explained to the American 
people the reasons for our resistance and our amnesty 
demand. We helped to maintain the amnesty discussion 
for six years, and the popular debate about the Vietnam 
War for two years after the liberation of Vietnam, and 
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AMEX has helped to create a 
more than four years after the signing of the Paris 
Ceasefire Agreement. AMEX was instrumental in 
developing exile as a part of the antiwar movement. 
After a frustrating initial period of political stalemate 
between the nonleft and left forces in NCUUA, we did 
learn that it was possible to work in a cross-class 
coalition without making basic political compromises. 
We came to view NCUUA through the perspective of 
the leftist legacy of united front work. At the founding 
of NCUUA, AMEX and our allies established a 
politically satisfactory statement of purpose. Had we 
insisted on a more politically advanced level of unity, we 
would have forced the nonleft out of the coalition. 
However, had AMEX not waged a persistent struggle to 
force NCUUA to implement its statement of purpose, 
the amnesty coalition would have discarded many of its 
. most progressive points of unity. Over our years in 
NCUUA, AMEX also fought to raise the overall level of 
NCUUA politics. Over these years of internal political 
struggle, members of the Steering Committee, the 
National Office, and many grassroots organizers came 
to follow our leadership. At various times, NCUUA 
came to depend not only on our political guidance but 
also on our technical skills. 
The Vietnam War did not result from 
Washington's good intentions turned 
sour, nor was it an aberration of policy. 
The war was fought to maintain U.S. 
hegemony over the global economy, to 
protect the interests of world capitalism 
at the expense of Third World peoples. 
With respect to the theory of united front work, 
AMEX functioned as the leadership substitute for a 
communist party in exposing bankrupt political lines, 
supplying politically principled lines, and creating 
program for the coalition. In the process, AMEX won 
many new supporters and made our share of enemies; 
but we were able to steer an unwavering course for 
NCUUA, preventing the coalition from making basic 
political compromises. We believe we provided strong 
leadership for a democratic rights struggle which would 
otherwise have been led by liberals. 
A liberal-led amnesty movement, we believe, would 
not have focused on developing grassroots support, but 
would rather have emphasized congressional and 
Democratic party lobbying. Whatever public education 
work the nonleft did would have been based on the 
notion of postwar reconciliation and forgetting the war. 
In contrast, AMEX led the struggle to make NCUUA 
commit itself to public education, agitation, and 
organizing around amnesty which would put the war 
itself, and its aggressive and unjust nature on trial, 
along with the men who planned it from their 
Washington offices. From the beginning of our work, 
we saw amnesty as an antiwar instrument with which we 
could educate Americans about the nature of U.S. 
new I orm of war resistance. 
imperialism: The Vietnam War did not result from 
Washington's good intentions turned sour, nor was it an 
aberration of policy. The war was fought to maintain 
U.S. hegemony over the global economy, to protect the 
interests of world capitalism at the expense of Third 
World peoples. It was a battle to insure easy access to 
the critical raw materials of Indochina and its Southeast 
Asian neighbors - tin, tungsten, rubber, oil, etc. It was 
a war to end all wars of national liberation in the Third 
World, wars waged by colonized peoples to regain 
control over their natural resource and national 
destinies. It was a war to preserve markets for 
American-made goods, and access to the unorganized, 
"cheap" labor of the Third World. 
Due to the nature of the war itself, the Washington 
decision-makers were stuck with a war that was hard to 
sell to Americans once it escalated after the mid-1960s. 
Ruling class families thought the war was important 
enough to wage, but not with their own sons. As draft 
calls began to mount, middle class families became 
uncertain whether they wanted their sons to fight this 
war. By taking advantage of the many loopholes in the 
Selective Service System, middle class sons were 
channeled into deferred college courses and 
occupations, leaving the brunt of tl1e draft quotas to be 
filled by working class and minority sons. Viewed in this 
context, the amnesty question could be utilized to 
illustrate class and race oppression in the U.S.: Not only 
were working class and minority sons bearing a 
disproportionate share of the fighting, but they were 
also refusing to fight the war in epidemic proportions, 
and now needed amnesty. 
Despite the fact that AMEX focused especially on the 
working class and minority forms of resistance -
deserters and bad paper vets - we were never able to 
develop as much support for amnesty among these 
sectors of society as we hoped. These forms of resis-
tance had been aimed at the Achilles heel of the military 
arm of U.S. imperialism. If the U.S. were not able to 
count on working class and minority sons to fight 
similar wars in the future, Uncle Sam would be in a 
terrible fix. An unconditional amnesty for all Vietnam-
era deserters and bad paper vets would set a more 
dangerous precedent than a draft resisters amnesty. 
Although during the war years public opinion polls 
detected less support for the war among the working 
class and minorities than among middle-class prof es-
sionals, the middle-class-led antiwar movement was 
unable to build strong support bases in these com-
munities. 
The amnesty movement was also unable to transcend 
this major characteristic of Vietnam-era American 
politics: It was not able to win strong support from 
minority communities and groups, trade unions and 
other working class organizations, the women's 
movement and the left. In this regard, the amnesty 
movement was able to gain support in the form of 
organizational statements on amnesty, and pro-amnesty 
news reports in organizational publications when 
amnesty periodically became frontpage news in the 
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corporate-owned media, but was generally unable to 
accomplish even that during periods of political lull. 
Part of the blame for this rests with AMEX and the 
amnesty movement for not developing closer ties with 
these constituencies, due to a lack of personnel to assign 
to these tasks. But more fundamental was that these 
constituencies had vastly different political priorities. 
Nonetheless, despite these crippling shortcomings, the 
amnesty movement was able to wage its campaign for 
more than four-and-a-half years. 
In conclusion, AMEX discovered that a small group 
of dedicated activists, working within a community 
lacking widespread political consciousness and commit-
ment to amnesty work, could lead the exile movement in 
progressive directions. As we grew with that movement, 
we remained acutely conscious of the special possibili-
ties of our role as American exiles. It was never easy to 
decide our course of action at particular times, but we 
were able to make detailed analyses of what could and 
should be done within the concrete political and logis-
tical realities of the day, and attempted, as Marxists, to 
apply dialectical materialism to our work. By working 
together over a long period of time, we were able to 
insure consistency and to develop a collective discipline 
that grew naturally from our longterm political and 
personal relationships. Once we had made a strong 
commitment to AMEX's amnesty work, the collective 
organism of the organization took on a life of its own, 
making it impossible for AMEX's work to stop before 
we had done all that was possible from our exile base in 
Toronto. We discovered in the process that AMEX 
could make a significant contribution to the · antiwar 
movement and to the evolution and promotion of a new 
form of war resistance. We h,ope our most important 
legacy will be a contribution to the right of future 
generations of Americans to resist unjust wars against 
Third World national liberation movements, should the 
need arise. 
If you wish to continue receiving the newsletter, don't forget to renew your subscription! 
GRANTS 
MASSACHUSETTS COALITION FOR OCCUPA-
TIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH (PO Box 17326, 
Back Bay Station, Boston, MA 02116). 
MassCOSH is a statewide organization uniting unions, 
working people, pro-labor professionals, and 
community groups in a program to improve job health 
and safety conditions in Massachusetts. One of 
MassCOSH's activities is the publication of a bi-
monthly, 16-page newsletter called Survival Kit. 
Resists's grant will help publish an issue of the news-
letter. 
THE ALAMOSA (COLORADO) COMMITTEE TO 
STOP GRAND JURY REPRESSION (PO Box 1071, 
Alamosa, Colorado 81101) 
As reported elsewhere in this newsletter, the FBI has 
launched a broad attack on the Chicano and Puerto 
Rican movements by using grand jury investigations 
into bombings as a way of harassing movement acti-
vists. Alamosa has become one of the centers of 
Chicano resistance in Colorado, and one of the 
Alamosa Committee's members has been jailed by the 
grand jury. Resist's grant will go for general support. 
COMMITTEE TO END STERILIZATION ABUSE 
(CESA), (Box A244, Cooper Station, New York, NY 
10003). 
CESA has campaigned around the issue of forced steril-
ization for over three years. The cut off of Medicaid 
funds for abortion has heightened the danger that poor 
women will be victims of sterilization abuse. Resist's 
grant will go for general support. 
THE MIDDLE EAST RESEARCH AND INFORMA-
TION PROJECT (MERIP), (PO Box 3122, Columbia 
Heights Station, Washington, DC 20010). 
MERIP Reports has consistently published some of the 
most useful and clear-sighted information about the 
situation in the Middle East. Resist's grant will help 
support a circulation drive to increase subscriptions. 
PHILIPPINE LIBERATION COURIER (PO Box 
24737, Oakland, CA 94623). 
The Philippine Liberation Courier is one of the most 
useful sources of information on the Philippines. It is 
published by the International Association of Filipino 
Patriots, an organization supporting the national 
liberation struggle in the Philippines. Resist's grant will 
help support a subscription drive aimed at making the 
PLC self-sufficient. 
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PEOPLE UNITED FOR INTEGRATION AND 
QUALITY EDUCATION (PO Box 92271, Milwaukee, 
WI 53202) 
People United is an organization working to support 
quality, integrated education in a school system which 
was ruled by the courts to be intentionally segregated. 
People United grew out of the struggles for integration, 
and is now attempting to ensure that court-ordered 
desegregation be carried out. Our grant will go to 
support a "Speak Out" for "Equality in Phase Ill." 
ENLISTED PEOPLES RIGHTS ORGANIZATION 
(EPRO) (PO Box 2016, San Diego, CA 92212). 
EPRO, formerly the Center for Servicemen's Rights, 
publishes the GI newspaper Up from the Bottom, and is 
active in counseling and organizing in the San Diego 
area. Our grant will go to help with the costs of an issue 
of the paper. 
CLARIDAD (PO Box 318, Cooper Station, New York, 
NY 10003). 
Claridad is the weekly newspaper of the Puerto Rican 
Socialist Party. Resist's grant will be used to help 
support a subscription campaign. 
THE NEWSPAPER (113 Monroe Street, Lynn, MA 
01901). 
The Newspaper, "Lynn's only anti-imperialist, socialist 
voice,'' is now eight years old. The paper covers and 
analyzes local and community politics, tenant and labor 
issues, women's issues, and national and internatinal 
economic trends. Resist's grant is for general support. 
YOUTH LIBERATION (2007 Washtenaw Ave., Ann 
Arbor, MI 48104). 
One of Youth Liberation's most successful publications 
has been their pamphlet How to Start a High School 
Underground Newspaper. Resist's grant will help 
support a fifth printing of this agitational classic. 
/DEES, (PO Box 134, Central Station, Jaimaica, NY 
11435). 
Idees is an inter-university and community publication 
put out by students and other members of the Haitian 
community in the New York region. Its aim is to 
promote discussion of Haiti's problems among Haitian 
exiles and immigrants. Resist's grant is for general 
support. 
